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AbSTRACT – This paper develops an 
account of what it is for a proposition 
to be self-evident to someone, based on 
the idea that certain propositions are 
such that to fully understand them is 
to believe them. It argues that when a 
proposition p is self-evident to one, one 
has non-inferential a priori justification 
for believing that p and, a welcome 
feature, a justification that does not 
involve exercising any special sort of 
intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true 
that p and there exists no reason to 
believe that the proposition that p is 
incoherent, then one knows a priori that 
p. The paper argues that certain deeply 
contingent truths, e.g., the truth that I 
would now express by saying “I exist”, 
can be self-evident to, and thus known 
a priori by, the person they are about 
at the time they are about; but, since 
they cannot be known a priori, or even 
expressed, by anyone else or at any 
other time, they should not count as a 
priori truths.
KEywoRDS – Self-evidence. Self-evident 
propositions. A priori truths, A priori 
knowledge. A priori justification.
RESUmo –  Este  estudo  desenvolve 
uma abordagem do que significa para 
uma  proposição  ser  autoevidente 
para  alguém,  baseado  na  ideia  de 
que certas proposições são tais que 
plenamente entendê-las significa crer 
nelas.  Argumenta-se  que,  quando 
uma proposição p é autoevidente para 
alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-
inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço 
bem-vindo, uma justificação que não 
envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial 
de faculdade intuitiva; se, em adição, é 
verdade que p e não existe nenhuma razão 
para crer que p é incoerente, então sabe-
se a priori que p. o estudo argumenta 
que certas proposições profundamente 
contingentes, por exemplo, a verda- 
de que eu agora expressaria ao dizer 
“Eu existo”, podem também ser auto-
evidentes para e, portanto, conhecidas 
a priori pela pessoa sobre a qual elas 
são, no momento sobre o qual elas são; 
mas, uma vez que elas não podem ser 
conhecidas a priori, ou mesmo expressas, 
por qualquer outro ou em qualquer outro 
momento,  elas  não  deveriam  contar 
como verdades a priori.
PAlAVRAS-ChAVE – Autoevidência. 
Proposições autoevidentes. Verdades a 
priori. Conhecimento a priori. Justificação 
a priori.
The term “a priori” is widely used by philosophers but there is not 
much agreement about what it means. There is wide agreement that it 
primarily refers to a way of knowing that is in some sense independent 10
of experience (though in what sense is not agreed) and that certain sorts 
of truths (e.g., elementary truths of arithmetic) are ones we typically 
know a priori and certain other sorts of truths (e.g., truths as to what the 
weather was like yesterday) are ones we do not and cannot know a priori. 
A derivative use of “a priori” is to specify a kind of truth, the kind which 
can be known a priori: a truth is a priori only if it is, or could be, known 
a priori. (later I will raise a doubt as to whether that “only if” should be 
strengthened to “if and only if”.) but beyond these points there is little 
agreement and I suspect that many who freely speak of the a priori have 
no well worked out view on the question of just what constitutes the a 
priori way of knowing. 
I will try here to give an account of one basic sort of a priori knowing. 
It is a sort that I hope might serve as the foundation and key to a full 
account of the ways of knowing that should count as a priori, but that 
large (one might say grandiose) project I will not be able even to sketch 
here.
my account will assume without argument two things about knowing 
in general and one further thing about a priori knowing in particular. 
About knowing in general I will assume, first, that one can know only 
facts, i.e., that if one knows that p then it is true that p; and second, 
that knowledge implies belief, i.e., that if one knows that p then one 
believes that p. About a priori knowing in particular I will assume that 
what makes a case of knowing that p a case of knowing a priori that p 
is the way in which the subject’s belief that p is justified: to say that a 
piece of knowledge is a priori is to say that the belief involved is justified 
a priori.
belief justifications in general, whether a priori or not, divide 
exhaustively and exclusively into two kinds, inferential and non-
inferential. In this paper I will try to explicate a non-inferential kind of a 
priori justification. The key notion in my explication will be self-evidence. 
I aim for an account such that if it is self-evident to a person that p then 
that person has a priori and non-inferential justification for believing that 
p; and if it is also true that p then normally they know that p and its being 
self-evident to them will be their way of knowing that p. And I want an 
account on which its being self-evident to a person that p will not be a 
matter of their exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty. later I will 
say something about why I take this to be an important desideratum.
1.  The account of self-evidence
I believe I can give an account that has these desirable qualities 
by exploiting the idea (to put it in a simple preliminary way) that some 
propositions are such that fully understanding them requires believing 11
them. believing them is at least part of what it is to fully understand 
them, because they state a condition such that belief that the condition 
holds is constitutive of fully understanding the proposition.
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I shall first present two definitions, one of what it is for a proposition 
to be self-evident (period) and the other of what it is for a proposition to 
be self-evident to a particular person. Then I will go on to argue that when 
a person believes a proposition that is self-evident to them then they are 
justified in believing it. here is a preliminary version of the first definition, 
preliminary because it will need a qualification, to be explained later (in 
this definition and hereafter I will use the phrase “what the sentence p 
says” as short for the phrase “what is said by one who utters p in normal 
circumstances in order to assert that p”):
(D1-prelim)  For any declarative sentence p whose meaning is such that what 
the sentence p says does not vary from one context of utterance to 
another,
it is self-evident that p if and only if: the sentence p is such that, 
for any person S, if S understands what the sentence p says then 
it follows that S believes what it says, namely, that p.2
(Note that the restriction that what the sentence says does not vary 
from one context to another means that this definition does not apply to 
any sentence containing indexical terms, such as the sentence “I exist”. 
later I will consider whether (and how) what such a sentence says can 
be said to be self-evident to its utterer.)
2.  Relativity to sentences
The definiens of (D1-prelim) speaks of what the sentence p says, 
rather than the proposition that p, mainly because the former is what 
I mean by talk of the proposition that p and I might as well say what 
I mean. Also, I find it easier to know what I’m talking about when I 
talk about understanding what the sentence p says than when I talk 
about understanding the proposition that p. Understanding what the 
sentence p says can be explained in terms of understanding the parts 
and the structure of the sentence; there is no comparably clear and   
 
1  This idea is, of course, not new. In Quine & Ullian 1970 statements are said to be 
self-evident just in case “to understand them is to believe them”. Peacocke 1993 
and Peacocke 1998 use the notion of a belief’s being constitutive of the possession 
of a concept in giving an account of a priori truth; understanding a proposition 
requires, of course, understanding the concepts involved in it.
2  I use the plaintext letters “p” and “q” as variables ranging over sentences and 
the boldface versions as variables ranging over names of sentences. Thus a value 
for an occurrence of “p” would be a sentence and a value for an occurrence of “p” 
would be a sentence in quotes.12
unproblematic way of explaining what is involved in understanding the 
proposition that p.
but speaking of understanding what a sentence says, rather than of 
understanding a proposition, makes the object of understanding relative 
to sentences. It makes the particular sentence mentioned a part of what 
is understood (viz., what that sentence says). For it may be that someone 
understands what sentence p says but not what a different sentence 
q says, even though what p says is the same as what q says, i.e., they 
express the same proposition.
This relativizing of understanding to sentences might be thought 
to introduce a problem for our definition of self-evidence. If there are 
sentences p and q that say the same thing but are such that p satisfies 
the definiens of (D1-prelim) but q does not, then our definition would 
force us to say that what p says is self-evident but what q says is not 
self-evident, even though what p says is the same as what q says – a 
violation of leibniz’s law.3
but is there any pair of sentences that fills this bill? The most plausible 
sort of candidate I know of
4 can be illustrated as follows. Consider the 
sentence (in decimal notation):
(A)  10 + 10 = 20
That seems a good candidate for being a sentence such that you could 
not count as understanding what it says if you didn’t believe what it says. 
Now consider the following sentence in binary notation:
(b)  1010 + 1010 = 10100
It certainly seems possible that someone who understands binary 
notation well enough to understand what (b) says might not yet see that 
what (b) says is true (especially if they were able to understand what 
 
3  one might be tempted to think that there is a more conclusive argument than the 
one I give below for the conclusion that there cannot be sentences p and q that 
say the same thing and such that one satisfies (D1-prelim) and the other does not. 
This conclusion would follow from the lemma that there cannot be two sentences 
saying the same thing that are such that someone understands what the one 
says but not what the other says. And one might think that this lemma follows, 
by leibniz’s law, from the premises (1) S understands what p says and (2) what p 
says is identical with what q says. but it does not. Premise (1) does not provide an 
extensional context for the referring term “what p says”, such that the truth-value 
of (1) must be preserved by substitution of any co-referring term. This is because 
(1) entails that (3) S knows some truth of the form “what p says is that r”. And 
from (3) and (2) it clearly does not follow that (4) S knows a truth of the form “what 
q says is that r”.
4  Suggested to me by bob Stalnaker in conversation many years ago.13
(b) says without translating it into decimal notation, i.e., into (A)). If 
so, I would want to say that it is self-evident that (speaking in decimal 
notation) 10+10 = 20, but it is not self-evident (speaking in binary 
notation) that 1010+1010 = 10100.
what (b) says might, however, seem to be the very same thing as 
what (A) says. After all, “1010” in binary notation designates the same 
number as “10” designates in decimal notation, and “10100” in binary 
notation designates the same number as “20” designates in decimal 
notation. but, I hope to persuade you, what (A) says and what (b) says 
are not the same thing.
what does each of the sentences in question say? (A) is in decimal 
notation. If you know how to interpret decimal notation you know 
that, for any numeral in that notation, dn…d2d1, the first digit on the 
right, d1, gives the number of ones [d1 × 100] , the second digit from the 
right, d2, the number of tens [d2 × 101], the third digit, d3, the number of 
hundreds [d3 × 10 2], and so on.5 So a decimal representation consisting of 
a single digit d1 is read as naming the number that is d1 × 1, one of two 
digits d2d1 means (d2 × 10) + (d1 × 1); one of three digits d3d2d1 means 
(d3 × 100) + (d2 × 10) + (d1 × 1); and so on. So what sentence (A) says 
to one who takes it to be in decimal notation and understands decimal 
notation is the following:
(A*)  one ten plus one ten equals two tens.
And that is surely self-evident, as self-evident as what is said by any 
sentence of the form “one X plus one X equals two Xs”, as self-evident 
as that 1+1 = 2.
Sentence (b) is in binary notation. If you know how to interpret binary 
notation you know that the first digit on the right, d1, gives the number 
of ones [d1 × 20], the second digit from the right, d2, the number of twos 
[d2 × 21], the third digit, d3, the number of fours [d3 × 22], the fourth digit, 
d4, the number of eights [d4 × 23], and so on. So a binary representation 
of a single digit d1 is read as naming the number that is d1 × 1; one of 
two digits d2d1 means (d2 × 2) + (d1 × 1); one of three digits d3d2d1 
means (d3 × 4) + (d2 × 2) + (d1 × 1); one of four digits d4d3d2d1 means 
(d4 × 8) + (d3 × 4) + (d2 × 2) + (d1 × 1); and so on. So what sentence (b) 
says to one who takes it to be in binary notation and understands binary 
notation is the following:
5  I use the boldface letters with subscripts “d1”, “d2”, etc. as variables ranging over 
the single-digit numerals “0”, ..., “9” – i.e., names of the numbers 0, ... ,9 – and I 
use the plaintext versions as variables ranging over those numbers.14
(b*)  one eight plus one two, plus one eight plus one two, equals one sixteen 
  plus one four.
In decimal notation it says that (8 + 2) + (8 + 2) = 16 + 4. And that 
is not self-evident. A relative beginner at arithmetic could fail to see 
that what “(8 + 2) + (8 + 2) = 16 + 4” says is true, even though she fully 
understands what it says – as evidenced, say, by her knowing how to 
go about figuring out whether it is true.
but it’s also pretty intuitive that what (b*) says is not  what 
(A*) says. These arithmetical truths are clearly different truths. The 
arithmetical fact that 10 + 10 = 20 is not the same as the fact that 
(8 + 2) + (8 + 2) = 16 + 4, and both are different from, for example, the fact 
that (22 + 2 2 + 2) + (22 + 2 2 + 2) = 52 - 5 – despite its being the case that “10”, 
“8 + 2”, and “22 + 22 + 2” all name the same number, as do “20”, “16 + 4”, 
and “52 - 5”. Someone might know the first fact while not yet knowing 
the second or third facts, or might know the first and second while not 
yet knowing the third.
It is indeed compatible with fully understanding what (A) and (b) say 
that one believe what (A) says and not what (b) says, but this is because 
they do not say the same thing. In general, if two sentences do say the 
same thing, then anyone who fully understands both sentences must see 
that they say the same thing.6 So pairs of sentences like (A) and (b) do 
not after all present a problem for definition (D1-prelim).
3.  Examples
here are some examples of sentences whose meaning in English 
is such that, according to (D1-prelim), what they would say is self-
evident.
(1) (a)  one plus one is two.
(b)  If a man is taller than his twin sister, then she is shorter than   
      he is.
(c)  Any triangle has three internal angles.
(d)  For any true or false propositions p and q: if it is true that p ↔ q   
      and true that p, then it is true that q.
(e)  A rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure.
( f )  A rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure with four equal sides whose   
      opposite sides are parallel.
6  obviously, in my view to individuate things sentences say, propositions, in such 
a way that they are identical if necessarily equivalent is not to individuate them 
finely enough.15
To say that what sentence (1)(a) (“one plus one is two”) says is 
self-evident is, according to (D1-prelim), to say that the meaning of the 
sentence is such that if a person fully understands what it says (i.e., what 
an utterance of it would say) then it follows that they believe what it says, 
namely, that one plus one is two. The idea is, to put it contrapositively, 
that if a person hesitates to accept what “one plus one is two” says, is 
uncertain whether one plus one is two, then it follows that the person 
does not fully understand what that sentence says. believing that one plus 
one is two is a necessary, constitutive condition of fully understanding 
what “one plus one is two” says.
by way of contrast, here are some sentences such that what they say 
is not self-evident:
(2) (a)  Seventy four times twenty three is one thousand seven hundred   
      and two.
(b)  most men with twin sisters are taller than they are.
(c)  The sum of the internal angles of any triangle equals the sum   
      of two right angles.
(d)  For any true or false propositions p, q, and r: 
    it is true that [p ↔ (q ↔ r)] ↔ [(p ↔ q) ↔ r].
(e)  most rhombuses shown in most geometry textbooks are not   
      square.
To say that what sentence (2)(c) (“The sum of the internal angles of 
any triangle equals the sum of two right angles”) says is not self-evident 
is to say that it is possible for someone to fully understand what that 
sentence says and yet fail to accept what it says, be uncertain whether 
the sum of the internal angles of any triangle equals the sum of two right 
angles. That a person hesitates to accept what (2)(c) says does not entail 
that the person fails to fully understand what (2)(c) says.
4.  Full Understanding
here there might arise an objection, one that presses me to say more 
about what constitutes full understanding. why shouldn’t we take a 
person’s failure to accept what (2)(c) says (that the sum of the internal 
angles of any triangle equals the sum of two right angles) as a failure 
to completely understand what it says? In particular, as a failure to 
completely understand what a triangle is? Doesn’t coming to learn the 
truth of what (2)(c) says, by seeing a proof of it, make one’s understanding 
of the essential nature of triangles more complete? And shouldn’t someone 
who lacks this more complete understanding of what a triangle is be said 
to lack a full understanding of what is said by sentence (2)(c)?16
Analogously, this questioner might say, someone may have a partial 
understanding of what a rhombus is, enough to know that a rhombus 
is a Euclidean plane figure, but lack the full understanding that would 
entail believing what (1)(f) says (that a rhombus is a Euclidean plane 
figure with four equal sides whose opposite sides are parallel). If fully 
understanding what (1)(f) says entails believing it, why doesn’t fully 
understanding what (2)(c) says entail believing it? If I want to say (as I 
do) that fully understanding what (1)(f) says entails believing it but that 
fully understanding what (2)(c) says does not entail believing it, then I 
need to give a plausible account of fully understanding what a sentence 
says that will yield this discrimination between the two cases.
There is, of course, a sense in which one who knows the fact expressed 
by (2)(c), that the sum of the internal angles of any triangle equals the 
sum of two right angles, understands the nature of triangles better or 
more completely than one who does not know this fact. but it does not 
follow that the latter person cannot be one who fully understands what 
sentence (2)(c) says. For what is required to fully understand what that 
sentence says is just that (a) one grasps the concept expressed by each 
of its descriptive (contentful) terms – e.g., “triangle”, “internal angles”, 
“sum”, “equals”, “right angles”, “two” – well enough to be able to tell 
with respect to any candidate case, given sufficient relevant information 
about it, whether the concept applies in that case – we can speak of this 
as having application-competence with respect to the term – and (b) one 
correctly perceives the grammar of the sentence, i.e., one understands the 
way the sentence is put together well enough to know how the meaning 
of each of its descriptive terms contributes to what the sentence says. 
And certainly one who is ignorant of the truth of what (2)(c) says may 
nevertheless satisfy these requirements with respect to (2)(c). he may have 
application competence with respect to every one of (2)(c)’s descriptive 
terms and grasp its grammar perfectly and yet fail to believe what it says.
In contrast, one who is uncertain whether to accept what (1)(f) says 
(that a rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure with four equal sides whose 
opposite sides are parallel) fails to have application-competence for the 
term “rhombus” (assuming that they have application-competence for 
the other descriptive terms in (1)(f)): there will be particular Euclidean 
plane figures such that they will be unable to tell whether those figures 
are rhombuses no matter how much relevant information they have about 
them (of a sort that can be acquired without already having the concept 
of a rhombus). They may have partial application competence for the term 
"rhombus", since application competence can come in degrees. They may 
know that "rhombus" denotes a Euclidean plane figure – i.e., that what 
sentence (1)(e) says is true – but nothing about what sort of plane figure, 17
or they may know that it designates one with four sides but nothing 
more, or one with four equal sides but nothing more. If their application 
competence for "rhombus" falls short of full competence then their 
understanding of what (1)(f) says falls short of full understanding.7
Similarly for the other sentences in (1), e.g., (1)(c). one who does 
not believe what sentence (1)(c) says (that any triangle has three 
internal angles) must fail to fully understand what it says, i.e., must 
lack application-competence for one or more of its descriptive terms 
(“triangle”, “three”, “internal angles”), or fail to grasp fully the grammar 
of the sentence, or both. No other explanation for the failure to accept 
what the sentence says is possible.
(I should note that, though adequate for present purposes, my 
explanation of full understanding is incomplete. I have described 
application-competence for the descriptive terms in (1)(c), (1)(e), 
(1)(f), (2)(c), and (2)(f) – terms such as "triangle", "rhombus", "right angle", 
Euclidean plane figure", "three" – as requiring the ability to determine 
with respect to any candidate case, given sufficient relevant information 
about it, whether the term applies in that case. Such a requirement is 
apt for those terms and many others in mathematics and logic, but it 
will not be apt for many other descriptive terms – for example, terms 
that are vague (“bald”, “red”, “tall”), evaluative terms whose meaning 
makes their application essentially contestable (“expensive”), and terms 
denoting natural kinds about which there are necessary truths that are 
only empirically discoverable (“water”, “elm”, “tiger”) – and it is not apt 
for proper names (“hannah”, “london”). For terms of these sorts it will 
be necessary to complicate in one way or another the specification of 
what is required for application competence and thus what is required 
for full understanding of sentences in which such terms occur. I will 
not try here to work out these complications. For a great many of the 
sentences containing such terms that say things that are self-evident, 
it will be clear that their doing so does not depend on what the right 
account of those complications is – such as, e.g., “A man with no hairs 
on his head is bald”, “An expensive car is not a cheap car”, “water is 
wet”, “Elms are not animals”, “Provided that Sarah and hannah exist,8   
 
7  Partial application competence can come in different varieties with different sorts 
of terms. Consider color terms. A young child might happily apply the term “red” 
to that shade we call “fire-engine red” but hesitate or refuse to apply it to other, 
more orangeish or bluish, shades of red.
8  The shorter sentence without this proviso – “If Sarah was born earlier than 
hannah was born, then hannah was born later than Sarah was born” – might not 
be accepted as saying something true by one who fully understands it but is not 
sure that the names “Sarah” and “hannah” both refer.18
if Sarah was born earlier than hannah was born, then hannah was born 
later than Sarah was born.”9)
5.  A qualification
I said above that for sentences like those in my list (1), if a person 
doubts what is said by one of them, no explanation of this is possible 
other than that they fail to fully understand what is said by the sentence. 
Actually, one other sort of explanation may sometimes be possible for 
some sentences such that what they say is self-evident. Clear illustrations 
of the recherché possibility I have in mind are hard to come by, but the 
following may suffice to explain the idea. Consider the sentence
(3)   For any property actually possessed by some entities, there is a   
    set whose only members are all of the things that possess that   
    property.
It’s plausible to think that there was a time when a person’s failure to 
believe what this sentence says would have been knockdown evidence 
that they lack application-competence for the term “set”, that they 
fail to fully understand what a set is (assuming they have application-
competence for the other descriptive terms in the sentence and grasp 
the grammar of the sentence). (If this is not an actual historical truth, it 
represents a possible history.) Then came Russell’s paradox: a deduction 
of a contradiction from what this sentence says and things said by 
other sentences that they took to be (and we still take to be) necessary 
truths (namely, that the property of being an entity that does not have 
the set-membership relation to itself is a genuine property [indeed, one 
possessed by some actual things] and that everything must either possess 
or lack that property). That proof gave people who fully understood 
what sentence (3) says reason to believe that what it says is incoherent   
– in the sense that its negation can be deduced from necessarily true 
premises – and thus reason to doubt, indeed deny, that what it says is so. 
And this gave them reason to think that the notion of a set, as hitherto   
 
9  Proper names offer a plausible example for which the decision as to whether a 
sentence containing them says something self-evident does depend on the right 
account of application competence for that sort of term. Consider sentences of 
the form ‘If a exists, then a = a’ where a is a proper name. If the convention in 
the language in which such a sentence occurs is that occurrences of the same 
name within the same sentence must refer to the same object (as in many formal 
languages), then what such a sentence says is self-evident. but if there is no such 
convention (as arguably there is not in English), then what it says is not self-
evident.19
defined by the axioms of “naïve” set theory (as we now call it), was   
incoherent.
This example suggests that to our definition of self-evidence we 
need to add a disjunct to cover the sort of circumstance illustrated in 
the example. Although that sort of circumstance does not obtain, and is 
highly unlikely ever to obtain, with respect to what is said by any of the 
sentences in (1), it seems hard to deny that it is at least a metaphysical 
possibility that it should do so. Thus, if we want our definition of self-
evidence to cover what is said by those sentences (as I do), we need to 
revise our definition by inserting a disjunct to cover this possibility.
our revised definition can be stated as follows
(D1)  For any declarative sentence p whose meaning is such that what the   
  sentence p says does not vary from one context of utterance to   
  another,
  it is self-evident that p if and only if: anyone who fully understands what   
  they would say by uttering the sentence p must either (i) believe what   
  they would thereby say, namely, that p, or (ii) think they have reason to   
  believe that what they would thereby say is incoherent.
6.  Self-evidence is noninferential a priori justification
I am now in a position to present my second definition, of what it is 
for a proposition to be self-evident to someone:
(D2)  For any declarative sentence p whose meaning is such that what the   
  sentence p says does not vary from one context of utterance to   
  another, 
  it is self-evident to S that p if and only if: it is self-evident that p, S believes   
  that p, and S does not think she has reason to believe that what sentence   
  p says is incoherent.
I claim that
(J)  If it is self-evident to S that p then S is justified in believing that p.
Consider again sentence (1)(c) (“Any triangle has three internal angles”). 
Someone who does not believe what that sentence says – who denies 
that what it says is true or is uncertain whether it is true – does not fully 
understand what that sentence says (provided that he does not think he 
has reason to believe that what the sentence says is incoherent). Someone 
who does fully understand what it says (where the just mentioned 
proviso holds), and therefore believes it, is, according to (J), justified in 
believing it.
how so? The fact which constitutes her being justified is simply 
the fact that she fully understands what the sentence says (and does 20
not think she has reason to think it incoherent). This entails that she 
believes what it says. So it cannot be that she ought not to believe it 
even though she fully understands what it says (and does not think 
she has reason to think it incoherent). Nor can it be that she ought not 
to understand what it says (or that she ought to think she has reason 
to think it incoherent). If she cannot be rationally criticized for fully 
understanding it (or for not thinking she has reason to think it incoherent), 
then she cannot be criticized for what these things entail, her believing 
it. Therefore, given that she fully understands what it says (and does 
not think she has reason to think it incoherent), she is justified in   
believing it.
The fact that she fully understands it (and does not think she has 
reason to think it incoherent) is her justification, but this fact clearly 
does not constitute an inferential justification: it involves no belief in any 
premise such that she believes that what the sentence says is legitimately 
inferable from that premise. If what a sentence says is self-evident to a 
subject, then the subject’s belief in it is non-inferentially justified.
And this sort of justification is clearly a priori (if any is). It certainly 
satisfies any plausible negative constraint on a priori justification: it 
is not justification by sense perception or by introspection; nor is it by 
inference ultimately from perceptual or introspective beliefs. Indeed, the 
only experience that justification by self-evidence requires of its subject 
is whatever was needed in order to fully understand what the sentence 
in question says, and that is no reason to deny that the justification is 
a priori.
An important merit of justification by self-evidence, as I have 
explained it, is that it involves no appeal to any special way of coming 
to believe what the sentence says – by clear and distinct perception, or 
rational intuition, or the like. It involves just fully understanding what the 
sentence says (and not thinking one has reason to think it incoherent) 
and therefore believing it. The justificatory force does not arise from any 
special justificatory quality attaching to the understanding or to the 
believing or to some accompanying mental state. It arises just from the 
fact that for these special sentences fully understanding what one of them 
says (while not thinking one has reason to think it incoherent) entails 
believing it. This is important because our account of justification by 
self-evidence, in being free of appeal to any special sort of mental state 
or process, is free of any of the difficulties or disputes that are apt to arise 
about the nature of such special states and about their credentials as 
justifiers. The account avoids having to face the question of what defines 
such a special state or process and the question of how its nature justifies 
one in believing its deliverances.21
7.  Does belief entail full understanding?
So in certain sorts of cases fully understanding (while not thinking 
one has reason to think incoherent) entails believing. Is there also 
an entailment the other way, from believing to fully understanding? 
Consider sentence (1)(e), “A rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure”. must 
someone who believes what that sentence says, believes that a rhombus 
is a Euclidean plane figure, fully understand what it says? well, no, it 
is not necessary that they fully understand that (or any other) English 
sentence. A monolingual speaker of Japanese can believe that a rhombus 
is a Euclidean plane figure. The question I really want to ask is this: If 
someone says, “I believe that a rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure" and 
he speaks the truth, does it follow that he fully understands what the 
sentence “A rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure" says?
Suppose S knows that the term “rhombus” designates a kind of 
Euclidean plane figure but does not know that a rhombus is a Euclidean 
plane figure with four equal sides whose opposite sides are parallel; S 
lacks application-competence for the term “rhombus” and so does not 
fully understand what is said by the sentence “A rhombus is a Euclidean 
plane figure”. And suppose that S lacks application-competence for 
any synonymous term, in English or any other language; i.e., S does not 
fully understand any sentence that says that a rhombus is a Euclidean 
plane figure. Does it follow that, although S can believe that the word 
“rhombus” designates a kind of Euclidean plane figure, S cannot believe 
that a rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure?
It is clear that at least some understanding of what a sentence says 
(or of what some same-saying sentence says), and more than a tiny bit, 
is necessary for being in a position to believe what it says. I find in a 
textbook on topology (Kelley, 1955, p. 146) after the word "ThEoREm" 
the following sentence:
If X is a locally compact topological space which is either hausdorff or regular, 
then the family of closed compact neighborhoods of each point is a base for 
its neighborhood system.
I am quite confident, and with plenty of justification, that what the 
author says with that sentence is true. but if I were to say, "I believe 
that if X is a locally compact topological space ... etc.", I would thereby 
pretend to a much greater comprehension of the concepts of topology 
than I in fact possess.
Suppose S knows very little English. S has learned that the word 
“rhombus” designates some sub-kind of the kind of thing that “Euclidean 
plane figure” designates, but doesn’t know what kind either term designates, 
doesn’t have application-competence for either term. It would surely be 22
misleading for S to say, “I know (believe) that a rhombus is a Euclidean 
plane figure.” S would imply that he understands what the sentence 
“A rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure” says more fully than he does.
how well does someone have to understand what a sentence says in 
order to be in a position to believe what it says? If we don’t require full 
understanding and don’t allow scant understanding, where in between 
shall we draw the line? I am unable to see any way of specifying a kind 
or degree of understanding other than full understanding that would 
clearly be enough for believing. And I’m inclined to think that, if we 
lack any principled and motivated way of drawing a line somewhere 
between scant and full understanding, then it would be arbitrary to draw 
it anywhere short of full understanding. Therefore, it should be drawn at 
full understanding. we should rule that a person cannot correctly say of 
herself “I believe that p” if she does not fully understand what p says.
we should, however, allow that a person who does not fully understand 
what p says might convey a truth about herself by falsely saying “I 
believe that p”. She may convey at least that she believes that what 
the sentence p says is true. And she may convey something more, 
about what she takes the relation(s) among the meanings of the words 
in the sentence to be. Someone who doesn’t know that a rhombus is a 
Euclidean plane figure with four equal sides whose opposite sides are 
parallel may say “I believe that a rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure” 
and mean that she believes that the word “rhombus” designates a kind 
of Euclidean plane figure. (Such a person, though failing to satisfy our 
criterion for full understanding of the sentence “A rhombus is a Euclidean 
plane figure”, because she lacks application-competence for “rhombus”, 
may nevertheless fully understand the sentence “The word ‘rhombus’ 
designates a kind of Euclidean plane figure.”)
If we have it that S’s believing what p says  entails  S’s  fully 
understanding what p says, we can affirm the following: In a case where 
what p says is self-evident, S's believing what p says (while not thinking 
she has reason to believe it is incoherent) entails S's being justified in 
believing it. If S believes what p says then S fully understands what p 
(or some same-saying sentence) says; and if what p says is self-evident 
(and S does not think she has reason to think it is incoherent), then by 
the argument given earlier, S's belief that p is justified.
8.  Self-evidence and knowledge
If S’s belief that p is true, as well as justified in this way by self-
evidence, does it follow that S knows that p? Suppose that, although 
the proposition that p is an elementary truth of logic or mathematics, 
it has recently become widely (but mistakenly) believed by experts 23
that the proposition that p is incoherent, but this fact is unknown to 
S, a non-expert. Such a fact would, it seems to me, require us to judge 
that S does not know that p, despite having a true belief that p justified 
by self-evidence. It would be nice to be able to illustrate this intuition 
with a sentence p such that we’d be prepared to grant that (a) it is true 
that p, (b) there is someone to whom it is self-evident that p, but (c) it is 
believed by experts that the proposition that p is incoherent. but I can 
think of no such sentence.
my earlier example of sentence (3) (“For any property actually 
possessed by some entities, there is a set whose only members are all 
of the things that possess that property.”) is not one about which we 
are prepared to grant that what it says is true. however, perhaps it can 
nevertheless be used to construct a fictional example that might be 
usable as an illustration. Suppose that eventually some, but not all, set-
theory experts come to think that what (3) says is true (that the best way 
to develop set-theory, after all, is to take that proposition as an axiom 
and reject some other premise involved in Russell’s paradox). To them, 
however, what (3) says, though true, will not be self-evident, for they 
are still aware of some reason to think that what sentence (3) says is 
incoherent – namely the fact that Russell's paradox is still held by some 
experts to be a sound proof – even though they now have what they take 
to be better reason to think that Russell's proof is not sound and that 
what sentence (3) says is not after all incoherent. Suppose now that they 
consider Schmege, a logician of the late nineteenth-century before the 
discovery of Russell’s paradox, to whom what (3) says was self-evident. 
Should they not judge that, although Schmege’s belief in what (3) says 
was justified and true, it was not knowledge – precisely because, though 
Schmege did not realize it, a contradiction can be deduced from what 
(3) says and other propositions that were also self-evident to Schmege? 
I think they should.
If this is right, then S’s having a true belief that p justified by self-
evidence is not sufficient for S's knowing that p. It must also be the case 
that there does not exist reason to believe that the proposition that p is 
incoherent. The relation between self-evidence and knowledge is then 
as follows: if it is true that p, it is self-evident to S that p, and there does 
not exist reason to believe that the proposition that p is incoherent, 
then S knows that p. This is an a priori way of knowing that p, because 
the justification involved, self-evidence, is a priori. So we can affirm the 
following:
(K)   S knows a priori that p if: it is true that p, it is self-evident to S that p, and   
  there does not exist reason to believe that the proposition that p is   
  incoherent.24
Could there be any reason to doubt this claim? There are those who 
deny that a priori knowledge is possible.10 how are they likely to react 
to claim K? It would not, I think, be plausible to deny that if someone 
satisfied the condition laid down in K then they would know a priori 
that p. Deniers of a priori knowledge would, I think, instead claim that 
this condition cannot be satisfied, specifically, that no sentence does, or 
can, satisfy our definition of what it is for something to be self-evident 
to S (D2) because none can satisfy our definition of self-evidence (D1). 
but could any case be made for this? I claim that the sentences in list 
(1) above satisfy (D1), that if someone fully understands one of those 
sentences (while not thinking she has reason to believe that what it says 
is incoherent), then it follows that she believes what it says. It’s hard to 
see what could show this to be wrong. It is hard to see how there could, 
for example, be a clear case of someone who is reluctant to believe what 
is said by the sentence “one plus one is two”, is utterly without any idea 
that what it says may be incoherent, but nevertheless fully understands 
what the sentence says.11 Until we are given reason to think that there 
are, or could be, cases of that sort for sentences like those in list (1), it 
is reasonable to hold that these sentences (and many others) do satisfy 
our definition of self-evidence, and that what such sentences say can 
therefore be known a priori.
9.  The contingent self-evident
Are there any sentences such that what they say is both self-evident 
and only contingently true (if true at all)? Consider any sentence of the 
following form:
12
(4)    If in the actual world there is exactly one thing that is a G, then     
    the actual G is a G.
what such a sentence says is self-evident: failure to believe what it 
says would betray failure to fully understand what it says. Anyone who 
fully understands this conditional sentence (and such a person must   
 
10  For example: harman 2003, Devitt 1998, Devitt 2005.
11  Goldman 1979 (p. 4) rhetorically asks, with respect to any simple logical truth, 
“Can’t we conceive of psychological operations that would suffice to grasp the 
components and … [composition] of … [the proposition] but do not suffice to 
produce belief in the proposition?” Assuming that grasping the components and 
composition of a proposition entails fully understanding it, I myself cannot conceive 
of such operations for any proposition expressed by one of the sentences in my 
list (1), that is, I cannot imagine anything I would be willing to count as satisfying 
Goldman’s description with respect to it.
12  Kitcher 1980 suggests that sentences like these express contingent a priori 
propositions.25
have mastered some technical terms in the philosophy of language) 
understands that if its antecedent is true then its consequent is true. but 
if its antecedent is only contingently true – it is only contingently true that 
in the actual world there is exactly one thing that is G (for example, let “G” 
be “person named Carl Ginet born in 1932 who became a philosopher”) – 
what the whole conditional sentence says is also only contingently true. 
It is true in the actual world but not in any other possible world where 
the thing that is G in the actual world exists but is not G (where I exist 
but am not named Carl Ginet or do not become a philosopher). For in 
such a world the consequent is false (it is not the case that the actual G 
is G there) but the antecedent is still true (it is still the case that in the 
actual world exactly one thing is G).
what a sentence of form (4) says is a peculiarly uninformative sort 
of contingent truth. For it gives us no information that distinguishes the 
actual world from any other world: it is, as Gareth Evans has put it,
13 only 
superficially contingent and not deeply contingent.
The superficiality of the contingency of what such a sentence says 
can be seen as follows. what it implies about any arbitrarily selected 
world w can be put this way:
(4a)  It is true at the actual world that ∃!xG(x) → it is true at world w   
    that G (the actual G).
This fails to hold for a world w where the actual G is not G. what (4) 
implies about the actual world, namely,
(4b)  It is true at the actual world that ∃!xG(x) → it is true at the actual   
    world that G (the actual G).
does hold because what (4b) says is formally true. And from a formal truth 
about the actual world we can learn nothing that distinguishes it from 
any other possible world. (4) is contingent because there are possible 
worlds where what (4) says would be false; but it is not deeply contingent 
because what (4) tells us about the actual world does not distinguish it 
from any other possible world.
Are there any sentences such that what they say is deeply contingent 
and also self-evident? I can think of none that, like (4), fits (D1), the 
definition of self-evidence given earlier. but consider the sentence
(5)   I exist.
because (5) contains the indexical term “I”, whose meaning is such 
that its referent changes depending on who utters it, definition (D1) does   
 
13  See Evans 1979, from which I have derived my understanding of this distinction.26
not apply to this sentence. but it is clear that one cannot understand 
what the sentence “I exist” says and not believe what it says. It certainly 
seems that the essence of my notion of self-evidence is present here.
If so, what definition of self-evidence for context-sensitive sentences 
will capture it properly? For a time I thought the following definition 
would do the trick:
(D3-prelim)  For any declarative sentence p whose meaning is such that what 
it says may vary from one context of utterance to another,
      if a person S utters p in order to make an assertion and understands 
and believes what she thereby says, 
      then what S thereby says is self-evident to S =def 
      for any person x, if x were to utter p in order to make an assertion and 
fully understood what she would thereby say, then it follows that x 
would believe what x would thereby say (assuming x does not have 
reason to think that what she would thereby say is incoherent).
what this definition gives us is no doubt a plausible way of using 
"self-evident" with respect to context-sensitive sentences. but it turns out 
that it is not the way I want (as Pryor 2006 has helped me to see).
what I want is a definition on the basis of which it will be plausible 
to claim that when what would be said by someone's uttering a context-
sensitive sentence is self-evident to that person, she has a priori (as well 
as non-inferential) justification for believing what would be said. but 
there are context-sensitive sentences that satisfy (D3-prelim) of which 
it would not be plausible (or at any rate I would not want) to claim that 
an utterer's justification for believing what she says is a priori.
Consider this sentence:
(6)    I am uttering a sentence.
About this sentence Pryor (2006) says:
Given what this sentence means, it follows that whenever it’s used to think 
a thought, that thought is true. (I count rehearsing a sentence to yourself 
privately as a kind of utterance.) And anyone who understands the sentence 
is in a position to know this. however, suppose you do utter the sentence 
(either privately or aloud). what then justifies you in believing that you are 
uttering it, or any sentence? It can’t be your understanding of the sentence. 
That would only justify you in having beliefs about what’s true whenever 
the sentence is uttered. It doesn’t help you determine when that condition is 
fulfilled. The natural thing to say is that what justifies you in believing you 
are uttering the sentence is your introspective or perceptual awareness of 
uttering it. hence, your justification for believing the thought you have by 
rehearsing (8) is a posteriori – despite the fact that you know, just by virtue 
of understanding (8), that whenever it’s used to think a thought, that thought 
is true. [Underlining added.]27
If a person utters (6) in order to make an assertion and understands 
what she thereby says, it follows that she believes what she thereby says; 
so this sentence satisfies (D3-prelim). (but couldn't she fail to believe 
what it says because she fails to be aware that she has uttered it? She 
could, but in that case it could not be that she uttered it in order to make 
an assertion: one cannot utter something while intending by that act to 
make an assertion without being aware of one's act.)
The awkward thing is that, as Pryor says, at least part of what 
justifies the utterer in believing what she says in uttering “I am uttering 
a sentence” is her awareness that she is uttering it. (And there are other 
sentences that satisfy (D3-prelim) of which a similar thing is true, e.g.,   
“I am uttering English”, “I am uttering a sentence about what I’m 
currently doing.”) I agree with Pryor that if awareness that one’s 
experience is currently of some particular sort is essential to one's being 
justified in a belief then one is not justified a priori: one’s justification is 
not independent of experience in the way required for it to be a priori. 
Since (D3-prelim) makes what is said in uttering these sentences self-
evident to the utterer, it is not a definition of self-evidence for context-
sensitive sentences that yields the result that, whenever what is said by 
the utterance of a context-sensitive sentence is self-evident to its utterer, 
that person is justified a priori in believing what they’ve said: it is not 
the definition of self-evidence for such sentences that I want.
what is the definition I want? I believe it is the following:
(D3)  For any declarative sentence p whose meaning is such that what it says   
  may vary from one context of utterance to another,
if at any given time a person S understands and believes what she would 
say were she then to utter p in order to make an assertion (whether or not 
S then actually utters p), then what S believes is self-evident to S = def
for any person x, if x understands what she would say were she to utter 
p to make an assertion then it follows that x believes what she would 
thereby say (assuming x does not have reason to think that what she 
would thereby say is incoherent).
This is not satisfied by sentence (6) (or by “I am uttering English” 
or “I am uttering a sentence about what I’m currently doing”). one can 
understand what one would say by uttering that sentence at a time 
when one is neither uttering it nor in any other way occurrently thinking 
the thought that it expresses. At such a time one will not (normally) 
believe what one would say by uttering it (namely, that one is uttering 
a sentence).
Contrast sentence (5) “I exist”. There cannot be a time at which one 
understands that sentence and fails to believe what one would say by 
uttering it (or it fails to be true). Every time at which one understands 28
it must be a time at which one believes it. This includes times at which 
one is neither uttering that sentence nor in any other way occurrently 
thinking the thought that it expresses. The same is true of some other 
sentences, such as “I am” or “The world contains me”.
but there are still others of which it is not true, such as “I am thinking” 
or “I am conscious”. “I am thinking” implies that one is in a particular 
state such that it is possible to exist without being in that state. At a time 
when one exists but is not thinking one might understand “I am thinking” 
but not believe what it says. on the other hand, if one is thinking and 
one understands “I am thinking”, then one will of course believe that 
one is thinking and be justified in doing so; but one's being justified does 
not follow merely from the fact that one understands what one would 
say by saying “I am thinking”; it’s required also that one be aware that 
one’s current state is of the thinking kind. Since one’s justification is in 
this way dependent on one’s having a particular kind of experience, it 
should be regarded as a posteriori.
but in the case of “I exist” or “I am” or “The world contains me” or any 
sentence such that what one says by uttering it is self-evident to one in 
the sense of (D-3), one’s being justified in believing what one says does 
follow merely from one’s understanding it. It is not also required that one 
be aware that one’s condition is of some particular kind that it might not 
have been, for none of those sentences implies that one's condition is of 
any particular kind. Since one’s justification is not dependent on one’s 
being aware of being in any particular condition, one's justification should 
be regarded as a priori, not a posteriori.
Although what a person would say by uttering “I exist” is self-evident 
to the utterer (in the sense of (D-3)), and hence known a priori by them, 
it is also contingent. And it is deeply contingent. For in knowing at a 
particular time that I exist I know something that distinguishes the 
actual world from some other possible worlds, namely, those where I do 
not exist at that time. what my utterance of (5) “I exist” would say about 
any arbitrarily selected world w, namely,
(5a)    It is true at world w that ∃xx = me
fails to hold for any world w where I do not exist. what my utterance   
of (5) would say about the actual world, namely,
(5b)    It is true at the actual world that ∃xx = me
is true, of course, but, unlike (4b), it is not formally true. So we do not have 
the sort of reason we had with respect to (4b) for saying that we learn 
nothing from its truth that distinguishes the actual world from any other 
possible world. Nor do I see that we have any other sort of reason for 29
saying so. So what I would say in uttering “I exist” is deeply contingent, 
as well as something I know a priori.
10.  A priori truth
Philosophers speak of a priori truth as well as a priori knowledge. 
we’ve used our notion of self-evidence to define a species of a priori 
knowledge. Can we use it to define a species of a priori truth? one 
plausible thought as to the general relation between a priori knowledge 
and a priori truth is that a truth is a priori just in case it is, or can be, 
known a priori. This might suggest that we should say that if a truth is, 
or could be, self-evident to someone, then it is a priori. or, more precisely, 
the suggestion is that we should say the following: if a sentence p is such 
that were S to utter p in order to make an assertion then S would assert 
a truth that is self-evident to S, then the truth S would have expressed 
by uttering p is a priori.
There can be no objection to this suggestion as long as we consider 
sentences that satisfy definition (D1), sentences such that what they 
say cannot vary from one context of utterance to another – like those 
in list (1) or sentences of form (4) (like “If in the actual world there is 
exactly one person named Carl Ginet who was born in 1932 and became 
a philosopher, then the actual person named Carl Ginet who was born in 
1932 and became a philosopher became a philosopher”).
but some sentences which are such that what they say does vary from 
one context of utterance to another – sentences to which definition (D3), 
but not (D1), applies – should, I think, give us pause. In particular there 
seems reason to doubt that a sentence which would when uttered by S 
express a truth self-evident to S that is deeply contingent – a sentence 
like (5) “I exist” – would thereby express an a priori truth. The reason is 
that the contingent truth S would thereby say cannot be self-evident to 
anyone else. There is no sentence such that were someone else to utter 
that sentence they would say what S says by uttering “I exist” and what 
they would say would (by D3) be self-evident to them. And there seems 
to be no other way that anyone else could know that truth a priori, that 
is, for others there is no way of knowing it of which it would be plausible 
to say that it is an a priori way of knowing it. And indeed there is no 
sentence such that were S herself to utter it tomorrow she would say 
what she says today by uttering “I exist” and what S would say by that 
utterance tomorrow would be self-evident to her. There seems to be no a 
priori way in which S could at some time other than now know the truth 
she would now express by uttering “I exist”. I think we should not want 
to classify as a priori any truth that can be known a priori only to one 
person at one time, the person and time the truth is about. I can know   30
a priori that I exist (now) and each of you can know a priori that you exist 
(now), but none of these truths is an a priori truth.
So, although 
(T1)  every a priori truth must be knowable a priori,
we cannot assert the converse, that every truth knowable a priori is   
a priori. The most we might venture to claim, I think, is that
(T2)  any truth knowable a priori that is not deeply contingent is an a priori 
  truth.
or, perhaps equivalently, that
(T3)  any truth that is in principle knowable a priori by anyone at any time   
  is an a priori truth. 
Does this hold? Consider the following sentence:
(7)    There exists now at least one person.
This sentence satisfies the condition in (D3): if anyone were to utter 
this sentence and fully understood what she would thereby say, then it 
follows that she would believe what she would thereby say, and so what 
she would say would be self-evident to her. It also follows that what 
she would thereby say is true and therefore something that she (then) 
knows a priori. but what she would say would be deeply contingent. 
moreover, unlike the case with sentence (5), what she would say would 
be the same thing as anyone else would say by uttering sentence (7). 
So we have a deeply contingent, and therefore not a priori, truth that is 
knowable a priori by anyone. Do we therefore have a counterexample to 
(T3)? No we do not. owing to the presence of the indexical “now”, the 
truth expressed by the utterance of sentence (6) at any particular time 
is not knowable a priori (by anyone) at any other time.
what about the following sentence?
(8)    There exists now, or has existed, or will exist at least one person.
The same is true of it: owing to the presence of the indexical “now”, 
the truth expressed by the utterance of (8) at any particular time is 
not knowable a priori (by anyone) at any other time. It is true that 
utterances of sentence (8) at two different times say two things that are 
metaphysically equivalent, that is, it is metaphysically necessary that 
if either of them is true then so is the other. but the truth expressed by 
the one utterance is not the very same truth as the one expressed by the 
other utterance. The particular time referred to in the one utterance (by 
“now”) is different from the particular time referred to in the other: In a 31
loose sense they say the same thing, but they say it about two different 
particular times. So in a strict sense they do not say the same thing.
If sentence (8) does not provide a counterexample to (T3) then, I 
conjecture, no sentence will do so. I also see no reason not to accept the 
converse of (T3), namely, the claim that
(T4)  Any a priori truth is one that is in principle knowable a priori by anyone   
  at any time.
So I hazard the following claim about the relation between a priori 
truth and a priori knowability:
(T5)  A truth is a priori if and only if it is in principle knowable a priori by   
  anyone at any time.14
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